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Abstract
Capsule Networks preserve the hierarchical spatial relationships between objects,
and thereby bears a potential to surpass the performance of traditional Convolu-
tional Neural Networks (CNNs) in performing tasks like image classification. A
large body of work has explored adversarial examples for CNNs, but their effec-
tiveness on Capsule Networks has not yet been well studied. In our work, we
perform an analysis to study the vulnerabilities in Capsule Networks to adversarial
attacks. These perturbations, added to the test inputs, are small and impercep-
tible to humans, but can fool the network to mispredict. We propose a greedy
algorithm to automatically generate targeted imperceptible adversarial examples
in a black-box attack scenario. We show that this kind of attacks, when applied
to the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB), mislead Capsule
Networks. Moreover, we apply the same kind of adversarial attacks to a 5-layer
CNN and a 9-layer CNN, and analyze the outcome, compared to the Capsule
Networks to study differences in their behavior.
1 Introduction
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) showed a great improvement and success in many Machine
Learning (ML) applications, e.g., object detection, face recognition, image classification (Bhandare et
al., 2016). However, the spatial hierarchies between the objects, e.g., orientation, position and scaling,
are not preserved by the convolutional layers. CNNs are specialized to identify and recognize the
presence of an object as a feature, without taking into account the spatial relationships across multiple
features. Recently, Sabour and Hinton et al. (2017) proposed the CapsuleNet, an advanced Neural
Network architecture composed of so-called capsules, which is trained based on the Dynamic Routing
algorithm between capsules. The key idea behind the CapsuleNet is called inverse graphics: when the
eyes analyze an object, the spatial relationships between its parts are decoded and matched with the
representation of the same object in our brain. Similarly, in CapsuleNets the feature representations
are stored inside the capsules in a vector form, in contrast to the scalar form used by the neurons
in traditional CNNs (Mukhometzianov and Carrillo, 2018). Despite the great success in the field
of image classification, recent works (Yoon, 2017) have demonstrated that, in a similar way as
CNNs, the CapsuleNet is also not immune to adversarial attacks. Adversarial examples are small
perturbations added to the inputs, which are generated for the purpose to mislead the network. Since
these examples can fool the network and reveal the corresponding security vulnerabilities, they can
be dangerous in safety-critical applications, like Voice Controllable Systems (VCS) (Carlini et al,
2016; Zhang et al., 2017) and traffic signs recognition (Kukarin et al., 2017; Yuan et al., 2017). Many
works (Hafahi et al., 2018; Kukarin et al., 2017) have analyzed the impact of adversarial examples in
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Figure 1: Architecture of the CapsuleNet for the
GTSRB dataset.
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Figure 2: Taxonomy of Adversarial Examples.
CNNs, and studied different methodologies to improve the defense solutions. Towards CapsuleNets,
in this paper, we aim to addressing the following fundamental research questions:
1. Is a CapsuleNet vulnerable to adversarial examples?
2. How does the CapsuleNet’s vulnerability to adversarial attacks differ from that of the traditional
CNNs?
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study of the vulnerability of the CapsuleNet to such
adversarial attacks for the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark - GTSRB (Houben et al.,
2013), which is crucial for autonomous vehicle use cases. Moreover, we compare the CapsuleNet to
CNNs with 5 and 9 layers, by applying affine transformations and adversarial attacks.
Our Novel Contributions:
1. We analyze the behavior of the CapsuleNet, compared to a 5-layer CNN and a 9-layer CNN, under
affine transformations applied to the input images of the GTSRB dataset (see Section 2).
2. We develop a novel algorithm to automatically generate targeted imperceptible and robust adver-
sarial examples (see Section 3).
3. We compare the robustness of the CapsuleNet with a 5-layer CNN and a 9-layer CNN, under the
adversarial examples generated by our algorithm (see Section 4).
Before proceeding to the technical sections, we present an overview of the CapsuleNets (in Section
1.1) and of the adversarial attacks (in Section 1.2), to a level of detail necessary to understand the
contributions of this paper.
1.1 Background: CapsuleNets
Capsules were first introduced by Hinton et al. (2011). They are multi-dimensional entities that are
able to learn hierarchical information of the features. Compared to traditional CNNs, a CapsuleNet
has the capsule (i.e., a group of neurons) as the basic element, instead of the neuron. Recent works
about CapsuleNet’s architecture and training algorithms (Hinton et al., 2018; Sabour et al., 2017)
have shown competitive accuracy results for image classification task, compared to other state-of-
the-art classifiers. Kumar et al. (2018) proposed a CapsuleNet architecture, composed of 3 layers,
which achieves good performance for the GTSRB dataset (Houben et al., 2013). The architecture is
shown in Figure 1. Note, between the two consecutive capsule layers (i.e., Caps1 and Caps2), the
routing-by-agreement algorithm is performed. It is demanding from a computational point of view
because it introduces a feedback loop during the inference.
1.2 Background: Adversarial Attacks
Szegedy et al. (2014) studied that several machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial
examples. Goodfellow et al. (2015) explained the problem observing that machine learning models
misclassify examples that are only slightly different from correctly classified examples drawn from
the data distribution. Considering an input example x, the adversarial example x∗ = x+ η is equal
to the original one, except for a small perturbation η. The goal of the perturbation is to maximize
the prediction error, in order to make the predicted class C(x) different from the target one C(x∗).
In recent years, many methodologies to generate adversarial examples and their respective defense
strategies have been proposed (Feinman et al., 2017; Bhagoji et al., 2017a; Bhagoji et al., 2017b).
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Figure 3: An adversarial attack under black-box assumption. (a) Classification for a clean image.
(b) Classification for an image perturbed by an adversarial intruder.
Adversarial attacks can be categorized according to different attributies, e.g., the choice of the class,
the kind of the perturbation and the knowledge of the network under attack (Papernot et al., 2017;
Yuan et al., 2017). We summarize these attributies in the Figure 2. A simple representation of the
attack scenario that we consider throughout this paper is visible in Figure 3. An adversarial attack is
very efficient if it is imperceptible and robust: this is the main concept of the analysis conducted by
Luo et al. (2018). Their attack modified the pixels in high variance areas, since the human eyes do
not perceive their modifications much. Moreover, an adversarial example is robust if the gap between
the probabilities of the predicted and the target class is so large that, after an image transformation
(e.g., compression or resizing), the misclassification still holds.
Recent works showed that a CapsuleNet is vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Jaesik Yoon (2017)
analyzed the CapsuleNet’s accuracy applying Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), Basic Iteration
Method (BIM), Least-likely Class Method and Iterative Least-likely Class Method (Kukarin et al.,
2017) to the MNIST dataset (LeCunn et al., 1998). Frosst et al. (2017) presented an efficient
technique to detect the crafted images on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST (Xiao et al., 2017) and SVHN
(Netzer et al., 2011) datasets.
2 Analysis: Affine Transforming the Images
Before studying the vulnerability of the CapsuleNet under adversarial examples, we apply some
affine transformations to the test input images of the GTSRB dataset and observe their effects on our
network predictions. We use three different types of transformations: rotation, shift and zoom. This
analysis is important to understand how affine transformations, which are perceptible yet plausible in
the real world, can or cannot mislead the networks under investigation.
2.1 Experimental Setup
We consider the architecture of the CapsuleNet, as shown in Figure 1. It is composed of a con-
volutional layer, with kernel 9 × 9, a convolutional capsule layer, with kernel 5 × 5, and a fully
connected capsule layer. We implement it in TensorFlow, to perform classification on the GTSRB
dataset (Kumar et al., 2018). This dataset has images of size 32 × 32 and it is divided into 34799
training examples and 12630 testing examples. Each pixel intensity assumes a value from 0 to 1. The
number of classes is 43. For evaluation purposes, we compare the CapsuleNet with a 5-layer CNN
(LeNet) (Ameen, 2018), trained for 30 epochs, and a 9-layer CNN (VGGNet) (Ameen, 2018), trained
for 120 epochs. They are both implemented in TensorFlow and their accuracy with clean test images
are 91.3% and 97.7%, respectively.
2.2 Robustness under Affine Transformations
Some examples of affine transformations applied to the input are shown in Figure 4. The analysis
shows that both the CapsuleNet and the VGGNet can be fooled by some affine transformations, like
zoom or shift. while the confidence of the CapsuleNet is lower. Moreover, the LeNet, since it has
lower number of layers, compared to the VGGNet, is more vulnerable to this kind of transformations,
as we expected. The CapsuleNet, with capsules and advanced algorithms, such has the so-called
routing-by-agreement, is able to overcome the lower complexity, in terms of number of layers and
parameters, compared to the VGGNet. Indeed, as we can notice in the example of the image rotated
by 30◦ of Figure 4b, the confidence is lower, but both the CapsuleNet and the VGGNet are able to
classify correctly, while the LeNet is fooled.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4: Affine transformations on the test images, with the corresponding classification predictions made by
the CapsuleNet, the VGGNet and the LeNet. (a) Example of a “30 km/h speed limit” sign. (b) Example of a
“Stop” sign.
3 Generation of Targeted Imperceptible and Robust Adversarial Examples
An efficient adversarial attack can generate imperceptible and robust examples to fool the network.
Before describing the details of our algorithm, we discuss the importance of these two concepts.
3.1 Imperceptibility and Robustness
An adversarial example can be defined imperceptible if the modifications of the original sample are
so small that humans cannot notice them. To create an imperceptible adversarial example, we need
to add the perturbations in the pixels of the image with the highest standard deviation. In fact the
perturbations added in high variance zones are less evident and more difficult to detect with respect to
the ones applied in low variance pixels. Considering an area of M ·N pixels x, the standard deviation
(SD, Equation 1) of the pixel xi,j can be computed as the square root of the variance, where µ is the
average of the M ·N pixels:
SD(xi,j) =
√√√√√ M∑
k=1
N∑
l=1
(xk,l − µ)2 − (xi,j − µ)2
M ·N (1)
Hence, when the pixel is in a high variance region, its standard deviation is high and the probability
to detect a modification of the pixel is low. To measure the imperceptibility, it is possible to define
the distance (D, Equation 2) between the original sample X and the adversarial sample X*, where
δi,j is the perturbation added to the pixel xi,j :
D(X∗, X) =
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
δi,j
SD(xi,j)
(2)
This value indicates the total perturbation added to all the pixels under consideration. We define also
DMAX as the maximum total perturbation tolerated by the human eye.
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Figure 5: Our algorithm to generate adversarial examples. The blue-colored boxes are aimed to fool the network,
while the green-colored boxes control the imperceptibility of the adversarial attack, whose images at the various
stages are represented in the red boxes.
Algorithm 1 : Our Algorithm for Generating Adversarial Attacks
Given: original sample X, maximum human perceptual distanceDMAX , noise magnitude δ, M ·N
pixels, target class, P, V
while D(X∗, X) < DMAX do
-Compute Standard Deviation SD for every pixel
-Select a subset P of pixels included in the area of M ·N pixels with the highest SD for every
channel
-Compute GAP , GAP (−), GAP (+)
if GAP (−) > GAP (+) then
V ariationPriority(xi,j) = [GAP (−)−GAP ] · SD(xi,j)
else
V ariationPriority(xi,j) = [GAP (+)−GAP ] · SD(xi,j)
end if
-Sort in descending order VariationPriority for every channel
-Select V pixels with highest VariationPriority between the three channels
if GAP (−) > GAP (+) then
Subtract noise with magnitude δ from the pixel in the respective channel
else
Add noise with magnitude δ to the pixel in the respective channel
end if
-Compute D(X∗, X) as the sum of the D(X∗, X) of every channel
-Update the original example with the adversarial one
end while
An adversarial example can be defined robust if the gap function, i.e., the difference between the
probability of the target class and the maximum class probability is maximized:
GAP = P (target class)−max{P (other classes)} (3)
If the gap function increases, the adversarial example becomes more robust, because the modifications
of the probabilities caused by some image transformations (e.g., compression or resizing) tend to
be less effective. Indeed, if the gap function is high, a variation of the probabilities could not be
sufficient to achieve a misclassification.
3.2 Generation of the Adversarial Examples
We propose an iterative algorithm that automatically generates targeted imperceptible and robust
adversarial examples in a black-box scenario, i.e., we assume that the attacker has access to the
input image and to the output probabilities vector, but not to the network model. Our algorithm
is shown in Figure 5 and Algorithm 1. The goal of our iterative algorithm is to modify the input
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image to maximize the gap function (imperceptibility) until the distance between the original and the
adversarial example is under DMAX (robustness). The algorithm takes in account the fact that every
pixel is composed of three different values, since the images are based on three channels. Compared
to the algorithm proposed by Luo et al. (2018), our attack is applied to a set of pixels with the highest
standard deviation at every iteration in order to create imperceptible perturbations. Moreover, our
algorithm automatically decides if it is more effective to add or subtract the noise, to maximize the gap
function, according to the values of two parameters, GAP (+) and GAP (−). These modifications
increase the imperceptibility and the robustness of the attack. For the sake of clarity, we also have
expressed the formula used to compute the standard deviation in a more comprehensive form.
Our algorithm is composed of the following steps:
• Select a subset P of pixels, included in the area of M ·N pixels, with the highest SD for every
channel1, so that their possible modification is difficult to detect.
• Compute the gap function as the difference between the probability of the target class, chosen as
the class with the second highest probability, and the maximum output probability.
• For each pixel of P, compute GAP (+) and GAP (−): these quantities correspond to the values
of the gap function, estimated by adding and by subtracting, respectively, a perturbation unit to
each pixel. These gaps are useful to decide if it is more effective to add or subtract the noise. For
each pixel of P, we consider the greatest value between GAP (+) and GAP (−) to maximize the
distance between the two probabilities.
• For each pixel of P , calculate the Variation Priority by multiplying the gap difference to the SD of
the pixel. This quantity indicates the efficacy of the pixel perturbation.
• For every channel, the P values of Variation Priority are ordered and the highest V values, between
the three channels, are perturbed.
• Starting from 3 · P values of Variation Priority, only V values are perturbed. According to the
highest value of the previous computed GAP (+) and GAP (−), the noise is added or subtracted.
• Once the original input image is replaced by the adversarial one, the next iteration starts. The
iterations continue until the distance D overcomes DMAX .
4 Evaluating our Attack algorithm
4.1 Experimental Setup
We apply our algorithm, showed in Section 3.2, to the previously described CapsuleNet, LeNet and
VGGNet. To verify how our algorithm works, we test it on two different examples. We consider
M=N=32, because the GTRSB dataset is composed of 32·32 images, P=100 and V=20. The value of
δ is equal to the 10% of the maximum value between all the pixels. The parameter DMAX depends
on the SD of the pixels of the input image: its value changes according to the different examples
because D(X∗, X) does not increase in the same way for each example.
4.2 Our algorithm applied to the CapsuleNet
We test the CapsuleNet on two different examples, shown in Figures 6a (Example 1) and 6e (Example
2). For the first one, we distinguish two cases, in order to test whether our algorithm works
independently from the target class, and if the final results are different:
• Case I: the target class is the class relative to the second highest probability between all the initial
output probabilities.
• Case II: the target class is the class relative to the fifth highest probability between all the initial
output probabilities.
By analyzing the examples in Case I and Case II, we can observe that:
1. The CapsuleNet classifies the input image shown in Figure 6a as “120 km/h speed limit” (S8) with
a probability equal to 0.0370.
For the Case I, the target class is “Double curve” (S21) with a probability equal to 0.0297. After
13 iterations of our algorithm, the image (in Figure 6b) is classified as “Double curve” with a
probability equal to 0.0339. Hence, the probability of the target class has overcome the initial
1The images have 3 channels, since they are in RGB format.
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Figure 6: Images for the attack applied to the CapsuleNet: (a) Original input image of Example 1. (b) Image
misclassified by the CapsuleNet at the iteration 13 for Case I. (c) Image misclassified by the CapsuleNet at the
iteration 16 for Case I. (d) Image at the iteration 12 for Case II. (e) Original input image for Example 2.
(f) Image at the iteration 5, applied to the CapsuleNet. (g) Image misclassified by the CapsuleNet at iteration 21.
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Figure 7: CapsuleNet results: (a) Output probabilities of the Example 1 - Case I: blue bars represent the starting
probabilities, orange bars the probabilities at the point of misclassification and yellow bars at the DMAX .
(b) Output probabilities of the Example 1 - Case II: blue bars represent the starting probabilities and orange
bars the probabilities at the DMAX . (c) Output probabilities of the Example 2: blue bars represent the starting
probabilities, and orange bars the probabilities at the DMAX .
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Figure 8: Images for the attack applied to the CNNs: (a) Original input image for Example 1 (b) Image at the
iteration 3, applied to the VGGNet. (c) Image at the iteration 9, misclassified by the VGGNet. (d) Original
input image for Example 2. (e) Image at the iteration 2, applied to the VGGNet. (a) Image at the iteration 6,
misclassified by the LeNet.. (b) Image at the iteration 13, misclassified by the LeNet.
one, as shown in Figure 7a. At this step, the distance D(X∗, X) is equal to 434.20. Increasing the
number of iterations, the robustness of the attack increases as well, because the gap between the
two probabilities increases, but also the perceptibility of the noise becomes more evident. After
the iteration 16, the distance grows above DMAX = 520: the sample is represented in Figure 6c.
For the Case II, the probability relative to the target class “Beware of ice/snow” (S30) is equal to
0.0249, as shown in Figure 7b. The gap between the maximum probability and the probability
of the target class is higher than the gap in Case I. After 12 iterations, the network has not
misclassified the image yet (see Figure 6d). In Figure 7b we can observe that the gap between the
two classes has decreased, but not enough for a misclassification. However, at this iteration, the
value of the distance overcomes DMAX = 520. In this case, we show that our algorithm would
need more iterations to misclassify, at the cost of more perceivable perturbations.
2. The CapsuleNet classifies the input image shown in Figure 6e as “Children crossing” (S28) with a
probability equal to 0.042. The target class is “60 km/h speed limit” (S3) with a probability equal
to 0.0331. After 5 iterations, the distance overcomes DMAX = 250, while the network has not
misclassified the image yet (see Figure 6f), because the probability of the target class does not
overcome the initial maximum probability, as shown in Figure 7c. The misclassification appears at
the iteration 21, when the sample (see Figure 6g). However, the perturbation is very percievable.
4.3 Our algorithm applied to a 9-layer VGGNet and a 5-layer LeNet
To compare the robustness of the CapsuleNet and the 9-layer VGGNet, we choose to evaluate
the previous two examples, which have been applied to the CapsuleNet. For the Example 1, we
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Figure 9: CNNs results. (a) Output probabilities of the Example 1 on the VGGNet: blue bars represent the
starting probabilities, orange bars the probabilities at the point of misclassification and yellow bars at theDMAX .
(b) Output probabilities of the Example 2 on the VGGNet: blue bars represent the starting probabilities and
orange bars the probabilities at the DMAX . (c) Output probabilities of the Example 1 on the LeNet: blue bars
represent the starting probabilities, orange bars the probabilities at the point of misclassification and yellow bars
at the DMAX .
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Figure 10: (a) D(X∗, X) behavior for the Example 1. (b) D(X∗, X) behavior for the Example 2.
consider only the Case I as benchmark. The VGGNet classifies the input images with different output
probabilities, compared to the ones obtained by the CapsuleNet. Therefore, our metric to evaluate
how much the VGGNet is resistant to our attack is based on the value of the gap at the same distance.
To compare the robustness of the CapsuleNet and the 5-layer LeNet, we only consider the Example 1,
because the Example 2 is already classified incorrectly by the LeNet2. Applying our algorithm to the
LeNet, we observe that, as expected, it is more vulnerable than the CapsuleNet and the VGGNet.
We can make the following considerations on our examples:
1. The VGGNet classifies the input image (in Figure 8a) as “120 km/h speed limit” (S8) with a
probability equal to 0.976. The target class is “100 km/h speed limit” (S7) with a probability
equal to 0.021. After 3 iterations, the distance overcomes DMAX = 520, while the VGGNet
has not misclassified the image yet (see Figure 8b) yet: our algorithm would need to perform
more iterations before fooling the VGGNet, since the two initial probabilities were very distant, as
shown in Figure 9a. Such scenario appears after 9 iterations (in Figure 8c), where the probability
of the target class is 0.483.
2. The VGGNet classifies the input image (in Figure 8d) as “Children crossing” (S28) with a
probability equal to 0.96. The target class is “Beware of ice/snow” (S30) with a probability equal
to 0.023. After 2 iterations, the distance overcomes DMAX = 250, while the VGGNet has not
misclassified the image yet (see Figure 8e). As in the previous case, this scenario is due to the
high distance between the initial probabilities, as shown in Figure 9b. We can also notice that the
VGGNet reaches DMAX in a lower number of iterations, as compared to the CapsuleNet.
3. The LeNet classifies the input image (in Figure 8a) as “120 km/h speed limit” (S8) with a
probability equal to 0.672. The target class is “30 km/h speed limit” (S1) with a probability
equal to 0.178. After 6 iterations, the perturbations fool the LeNet, because the image (In Figure
8f), is classified as the target class with a probability equal to 0.339. The perturbations become
perceptible after 13 iterations (Figure 8g), where the distance overcomes DMAX = 520.
2Note: the image of Example 2 belongs to the subset of images that are correctly classified by the CapsuleNet
and the VGGNet, but incorrectly by the LeNet
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4.4 Comparison and results
From our analyses, we can observe that the vulnerability of the 9-layer VGGNet to our adversarial
attack is slightly lower than the vulnerability of the CapsuleNet, since the former one requires more
perceivable perturbations to be fooled. Our observation is remarked by the graphs in Figure 10: the
value of D(X∗, X) increases more sharply for the VGGNet than for the CapsuleNet. Hence, the
perceivability of the noise in the image can be measured as the value of D(X∗, X) divided by the
number of iterations: the noise in the VGGNet becomes perceivable after few iterations. Moreover,
we can observe that the choice of the target class plays a key role for the success of the attack.
We notice that other features that evidence the differences between the VGGNet and the CapsuleNet
are crucial. The VGGNet is deeper and contains a larger number of weights, while the CapsuleNet
can achieve a similar accuracy with a smaller footprint. This effect causes a disparity in the prediction
confidence between the two networks. It is clear that the CapsuleNet has a much higher learning
capability, compared to the VGGNet, but this phenomena does not reflect to the prediction confidence.
Indeed, comparing Figures 7 and 9, we can notice that the output probabilities predicted by the
CapsuleNet are close to each other, even more than the LeNet. However, the perturbations does not
affect the output probabilities of the CapsuleNet as much as for the cases of the CNNs. The LeNet, as
expected, even though it has a similar depth and similar number of parameters, is more vulnerable
than the CapsuleNet.
Moreover, recalling from Section 2, we observed that the VGGNet and the CapsuleNet are more
resistant than the LeNet to the affine transformations: this behavior is consistent with the results
obtained applying our adversarial attack algorithm.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed an algorithm to generate targeted adversarial attacks in a black box
scenario. We applied our attack to the GTSRB dataset and we verified its impact on a CapsuleNet,
a 5-layer LeNet and a 9-layer VGGNet. Our experiments show that the CapsuleNet appears more
robust than the LeNet to the attack, but slightly less than the VGGNet, because the modifications of
the pixels in the traffic signs are less perceivable when our algorithm is applied to the CapsuleNet,
rather than to the VGGNet. A serious issue for the CapsuleNet is that the gap between the output
probabilities is lower than the one computed on the VGGNet predictions. However, the change in
absolute values of the probabilities at the output of the CapsuleNet is lower than their changes in the
VGGNet. Hence, further modifications of the CapsuleNet algorithm, aiming to increase the prediction
confidence, would be beneficial to improve its robustness.
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